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Magee v. Amiss: The Conflict Continues Between the
Public Records Doctrine and Community Property Laws
Husband and wife are married when they buy the family home.
The act of sale contains both their names. Soon wedded bliss wanes,
wife is awarded a separation, and she moves out of state. Unfortunately,
nothing concerning this judgment is recorded in the public records.
Several years later, husband, while still residing in the family home,
contracts to reroof the house. When husband fails to pay for the roofing
job, the roofer obtains a judgment and a writ of fieri facias; the house
is sold in satisfaction of the judgment. Shortly thereafter, wife demands
that the sale be declared null and void and that her undivided one-half
interest in the property be recognized.
The roofer and subsequent purchasers argue that, at the time of
the seizure, husband was "head and master" of the community property
and the proper party defendant in litigation surrounding such property.
They also assert that, since there was an absence from the public records
of any judgment signifying an end of the community, they were entitled
to believe that husband could alienate or encumber the property. Wife
insists that she has a legally protected interest, and that the failure to
notify her of the sale unconstitutionally deprived her of her due process
rights.
These brief facts of Magee v. Amiss' demonstrate a clear conflict
between the public records doctrine and a person's due process right to
notice of alienation. This note explores the viability of the public records
doctrine in light of the supreme court's decision in Magee that constitutional notice and due process supersede the public records doctrine.
The supreme court's opinion appears to disregard over one hundred
years of jurisprudence and legislation concerning the recordation of
ownership in favor of the proposition that a person's property may not
be taken and sold without notice of the seizure and sale.
After detailing the facts of Magee v. Amiss, this note summarizes
the interplay of the public records doctrine and community property.
An analysis of the Magee opinion follows, and the note concludes with
a discussion of some unanswered questions and implications that may
affect the stability of title.

1.

Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVImW.
502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987).
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TBE FACTS OF Magee v. Amiss

As recited in the act of sale with assumption of mortgage, Mr. and
Mrs. Archibald Magee were married to and living with each other when
they purchased a certain lot and house in Baton Rouge in 1970. In
1971, Mrs. Magee filed a suit for separation from bed and board in
East Baton Rouge Parish. Soon afterwards, the Magees were judicially
separated, dissolving their community of acquets and gains.
Shortly after the judicial separation, Mrs. Magee moved to Virginia,
and Mr. Magee continued to reside in the family home. In early 1978,
Mr. Magee had a new roof installed on the residence by Reynolds
Roofing Company, Inc. (Reynolds). When Mr. Magee failed to pay the
balance due to Reynolds, the roofing company filed suit against Mr.
Magee only. Mrs. Magee was neither named as a party nor served with
the suit papers. The record indicated that the judgment of separation
was not recorded in the mortgage records of East Baton Rouge Parish
until April 30, 1980, and neither a community property settlement nor
a notice of lis pendens was ever recorded.
Reynolds obtained a judgment against Mr. Magee for $1,856 on
September 11, 1979. Thereafter, the court issued a writ of fieri facias,
and the sheriff seized and sold the residence on April 2, 1980, in
satisfaction of the judgment in favor of Reynolds. The property was
sold to a Mr. and Mrs. Stockmann for $49,000, and $30,647.15 of the
proceeds were paid to Mr. Magee. The sheriff's sale purported to convey
full ownership of the property in question. In October of 1980, the
Stockmanns sold the property for $85,000 to a Mr. and Mrs. Inglehart,
who mortgaged the property to River City Federal Savings & Loan
2
Association (River City Federal).
On March 18, 1981, Mrs. Magee filed suit seeking to have the
judicial sale of the property and its subsequent sale declared null and
void and to have the court recognize her undivided one-half interest in
the property. In the alternative, Mrs. Magee prayed for judgment against
Mr. Magee in the sum of $15,323.58 (one-half of the $30,647.15 that
Mr. Magee was given after the judicial sale). The trial judge granted
the motions of summary judgment filed on behalf of Reynolds, the
Stockmanns and River City Federal, and dismissed Mrs. Magee's suit
against these defendants.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal 3 found that Reynolds
had properly filed suit against Mr. Magee alone; that the sheriff 4 correctly

2. Note that the Ingleharts bought the property after Mrs. Magee had recorded the
judgment of separation.
3. Magee v. Amiss, 490 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
4. To satisfy curiosity the "Amiss" in the casename is the former sheriff of East
Baton Rouge Parish, Al Amiss.
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seized and sold the property to satisfy the judicial mortgage created by
Reynolds' judgment; and that the unrecorded judgment of separation
had no effect as to Reynolds, the Stockmanns, the Ingleharts and River
City Federal, all of whom were third parties protected by the public
records doctrine. The court of appeal affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of Reynolds, the Stockmanns and River City Federal and
remanded for further proceedings as to Mrs. Magee's claim against Mr.
Magee. 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ to review the court
of appeal's decision. 6 The court held that Mrs. Magee had a legally
protected interest in the community property that was acquired during
the course of the marriage and recorded in both their names. She was
therefore entitled to notice of the sale of this property by the sheriff
to satisfy the judicial mortgage created by the judgment against her
husband subsequent to their separation. Absent notice, she was entitled
to an order voiding the sale, as to her interest revealed in the recorded
deed, although no property settlement of the community pursuant to
her judgment of separation had been recorded. The supreme court
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Reynolds, while reversing
the summary judgment in favor of the Stockmanns and River City
Federal. The court remanded the case as to the Ingleharts, River City
Federal, Mr. Magee, 7 and several third party demands which are beyond
the scope and purpose of this paper.
II.

Ti

PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE

To understand the nature of the conflict between the public records
doctrine and the community property laws, one must begin with the
general background of the doctrine. Several exceptions to the public
records doctrine then help emphasize how community property laws have
interacted with the doctrine. The most coherent manner of examining
the community property section requires analysis in two parts: the existence of the community and its termination.
A.

The Public Records Doctrine

At various times in Louisiana history, the Louisiana Constitution, 8
Civil Code 9 and the Louisiana Revised Statutes1° have declared that, if
5. In Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d at 570 n.5, the supreme court stated the court
of appeal was incorrect in believing that the trial court's judgment dismissed Mrs. Magee's
suit against the Ingleharts.
6. 496 So. 2d 316 (La. 1986).
7. Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d at 573.
8. La. Const. art. 19, § 19 (1921), amended by 1938 La. Acts No. 35 and 1962
La. Acts No. 548.
9.

La. Civ. Code art. 2266 (1870) (redesignated La. R.S. 9:2756 (Supp. 1987); see

infra note 13).
10. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1965). See infra note 11.
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an ownership interest is required to be recorded, it is "utterly null and
void" as to third persons if not so recorded. Today the heart of the
public records doctrine comes from Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2721,"
2755,2 and 2756.11 The present law has not changed the prior law. All
sales, contracts, and judgments affecting immovable property do not
affect third parties unless such documents are recorded in the appropriate
public records. 4 "Public records" refers to the conveyance and mortgage
records, and not to records such as family court or successions.
This, doctrine was intended to protect innocent third parties who
have no knowledge of the existence of any rights and/or claims
against property, and allows them to take free and clear of any
such unrecorded claims. This doctrine has been enforced even
where the purchaser had actual knowledge of the outstanding
unrecorded claims.' 5
It-is important to remember that the public records doctrine is a negative
doctrine. A person may rely on the absence of other documents from

11. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1965) provides:
No sale, contract, counter letter, lien, mortgage, judgment, surface lease, oil,
gas or mineral lease or other instrument of writing relating to or affecting
immovable property shall be binding on or affect third persons or third parties
unless and until filed for registry in the office of the parish recorder of the
parish where the land or immovable is situated; and neither secret claims or
equities nor other matters outside the public records shall be binding on or
affect such third parties.
12. La. R.S. 9:2755 (Supp. 1987) provides:
All sales of immovable property made by any sheriff or other officer, by virtue
of any execution or other order of court; matrimonial agreements, affecting
immovables within this state; and final judgments affecting immovable property
shall be recorded in the parish where the immovable property is situated.
It was formerly La. Civ. Code art. 2265 but was redesignated by 1984 Acts No. 331,
§ 5, effective Jan. 1, 1985.
13. La. R.S. 9:2756 (Supp. 1987) provides:
All sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable property, which sale not
be so recorded, shall be utterly null and void except between the parties thereto.
The recording may be made at any time, but shall only affect third persons
from the time of recording.
The recording shall have effect from the time when the act is deposited in
the proper office, and indorsed by the proper officer.
It was formerly La. Civ. Code art. 2266 but was redesignated by 1984 Acts
No. 331, § 5, effective Jan. 1, 1985.
14., La. R.S. 9:2721, 2755, 2756 (1965 & Supp. 1987). See also Meares v. Pioneer
'Prod. Corp., 382 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 667 '(La.
1980); Judice-Henry-May Agency, Inc. v. Franklin, 376 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 508 (La. 1980); Brewster Dev. Co. v. Fielder, 271 So. 2d
299 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), not considered, 272 So. 2d 695 (La. 1973).
15. Motwani v. Fun Centers, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
See also Wright v., DeFatta, 142 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 244 La.
251, 152 So. 2d 10 (1963).
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the public records; the simple fact that an instrument is recorded does
not guarantee its validity. A person is not protected by reliance on the

presence in the public records of a judgment of possession based on a
forged will,16 a fraudulent cancellation of a recorded mortgage, 7 or any
other recorded document that may be forged, or altered. Most importantly for purposes herein, one is not protected by reliance on the
presence of statements concerning the marital status of a person in
recorded documents. 8 The usual defense raised by third party purchasers
in such cases is reliance upon the public records. This defense neglects
the basic negative character and limited scope of the doctrine and
construes recordation as creating rights, rather than making rights effective as to third parties. In other words, where the doctrine applies,

what is not recorded is not effective, but recordation in the public
records does not create any rights.

Louisiana jurisprudence has had no difficulty with this aspect of
the public records doctrine. The courts have expanded the doctrine to
include instances where a party had actual knowledge. In McDuffie v.

Walker' 9 the court said, "[O]ne may acquire a valid title to such property,
though he [knew] that as between his vendor and another an unrecorded
title has already been passed." ' 20 This has created the proverbial "race
to the courthouse."

In other words, if the sale from Owner to Anna

is not recorded, it is ineffective against a third person, Norvie, whether
or not Norvie knew of the sale. In such a case, Anna's only recourse
is against Owner. If the sale from Owner to Anna is recorded, it becomes

effective against Norvie, even if Norvie examined the public records2 and
failed to discover it or even if it had been misfiled by the clerk.

1

16. Succession of Rosinski, 158 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
17. Gallagher v. Conner, 138 La. 633, 70 So. 539 (1915).
18. Succession of James, 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
19. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909). McDuffie relied on Harang v. Plattamier, 21
La. Ann. 426 (1869), a case where a third mortgage was held to outrank two earlier
unrecorded mortgages despite the fact that the act creating the third mortgage referred
to the two earlier mortgages.
See also Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. La.
1972); Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So. 2d 392
(1958); Knowles v. Wholesale Elec. Supply of Shreveport, Inc., 388 So. 2d 426 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1980); Judice-Henry-May Agency, Inc. v. Franklin, 376 So. 2d 991, 991 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 508 (La. 1980); Wood v. Morvant, 321 So.
2d 914 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Loeb v. Badalamenti, 192 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966), writ denied, 250 La. 24, 193 So. 2d 530 (1967).
20. McDuffie, 125 La. at 166, 51 So. at 105.
21. Progressive -Bank & Trust Co. v. Dieco Speciality Co., Inc. 421 So. 2d 345 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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B. The Community Property Exception to the Public Records
Doctrine

In certain instances public policy dictates exceptions to the public
records doctrine, making some ownership interests and privileges effective
against third persons without any recordation. Such exceptions include:
the fact of death, the fact of bad faith acquisitive prescription, certain
22
privileges arising upon death, and certain community property interests.
The most important exception concerning Magee v. Amiss is that of
community property. Problems in the community property area arise
from both the existence and termination of the community.
1. Existence of the Community
The existence or nonexistence of a state of marriage affects title to
immovable property. Under present matrimonial regime law, property
purchased by either spouse, with certain exceptions, is presumed to be
community property, and title vests in the respective community partners
at the instant of acquisition. 2 Since marriage directly affects title to
property, it would seem logical to require that the marriage certificate
be recorded to be effective against third parties as a "contract affecting
immovable property." It has been held, however, that although marriage

22. While these examples are called "exceptions" to the public records doctrine, they
are not true exceptions because they are not within the true meaning of "sales, contracts,
and judgments affecting immovable property." La. R.S. 9:2756 (Supp. 1987).
Inheritance rights do not arise from a contract or judgment. The fundamental principle
is that no one except the heirs or legatees can convey good title and that a sale or
mortgage by anyone else in invalid. Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some
Principles and Some Problems, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 491, 505 (1965). In Long v. Chailan,
187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937), the court said that, although the fact of the plaintiffs'
inheriting title from their mother was not a matter of record, the defense of its absence
from the public records did not prevail. The court felt that it was well settled that the
laws of recordation and the doctrine of McDuffie were "not to be construed so as to
defeat the rights of heirs who inherit from their mother her half interest in the community
property ....
Id. The forced heirs may follow the property despite what is or is not
recorded.
An ownership interest in immovable property may be acquired by acquisitive prescription
of thirty years without the need of just title. La. Civ. Code art. 3486. This type of
ownership is based on possession, not on a contract or sale. Consequently, the fact that
acquisitive prescription is running in favor of a bad faith possessor of the immovable
will never appear in the public records.
The charges against a succession, such as funeral charges, attorney's fees for settling
the succession, the thousand dollars secured in certain cases to the surviving spouse or
minor heirs of the deceased, and all claims against the succession originating after the
death of the person whose succession is under administration, need not be recorded in
order to be paid before the debts contracted by the deceased person. La. Civ. Code art.
3276.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 2340.

1988]

NOTES

has some of the elements of a private contract, it creates a social status
or personal relation which affects not only the contracting parties, but
also their posterity and the welfare of society.21 Thus, the marriage
certificate need not be recorded in order to affect third parties.
This treatment created a conflict between the two legal regimes of
recordation and community property. In 1920, the Louisiana Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the conflict in Succession of James.25 The
mortgagee argued that no sale or encumbrance of immovable property
was effective against third persons unless it was recorded. The husband,
who was neither owner nor mortgagor of record, believed he owned
one-half of the property due to community property laws. 26 The court
resolved this conflict by reasoning that the fact of marriage was an
exception to the doctrine. Notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate was recorded, property acquired by either spouse is community
property, creating rights in the spouse not a party to the contract. The
policy underlying the decision was that the marriage certificate need not
be recorded in the public records of every parish in the state where
immovable property may be purchased in order to affect third persons.
One spouse would have no way of foreseeing in which parish the other
spouse might acquire land. Moreover, marriage does not of itself immediately affect immovables; only when there is a subsequent purchase
by one spouse does the marriage affect title to property. 27 In an effort
to eliminate the destabilizing effects this decision would have on sales
of immovable property, the legislature passed a law requiring that the
2
marital status of the parties to be recited in the deed or mortgage.
2.

Termination of the Community

It would be natural to assume that the policies and arguments
creating the marriage exception would be applicable to judgments of

24. La. Civ. Code art. 86. See also Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1919),
and cases cited therein.
25. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920). The wife bought and mortgaged property using
her maiden name and declared herself a feme sole. The wife died and her creditors seized
and sold the property to satisfy claims against her. The court limited the creditor's share
to the wife's one-half interest, despite the fact that the public records were devoid of
any notice to forewarn the creditors of her true marital status.
26. 147 La. at 945, 86 So. at 405.
27. Redmann, supra note 22, at 504.
28. Outside of Orleans Parish, La. R.S. 44:135 (1982) prohibits recordation of conveyances and encumbrances in which the marital status is not given. In Orleans, the
general requirement of La. R.S. 35:11 (1985) is that notaries must include the marital
status of the parties in their act. Neither statute requires recordation of the marriage
certificate to make the community property regime effective as to third parties.
It has been held, however, that both of these statutes are directory only and cannot
affect the validity of the instrument. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Michael, 244
So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir.), not considered, 258 La. 368, 246 So. 2d 685 (1971).
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separation and divorce. The jurisprudence, however, indicates that in
instances of a separation or divorce the public records doctrine prevails.
The legal regime of community property is terminated by the death of
a spouse, by a judgment of divorce or separation from bed and board,
or by the married couple's agreement to a separation of property without
termination of the marriage. 29 Upon termination of the community, the
husband and wife, or their heirs, become ordinary co-owners in indivision
of all community property.30 At this point, the co-owners may partition
the property if they desire.
Although the fact of marriage is an exception to the public records
doctrine, divorce and separation are not exceptions to the laws of
recordation. In Humphreys v. Royal,3 the supreme court held that failure
to record a judgment of divorce left the divorced spouse in the same
position as if still married, insofar as third persons buying community
property from the other spouse were concerned. After recognizing that
the subject property belonged to the community of acquets and gains
and stating that this community was dissolved by the divorce, the court
decided that the articles making up the public records doctrine were
clear and unambiguous.3 2 Accepting the premise that divorce is a "judgment . . . affecting immovable property" covered by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2756,11 the court's declaration of the nullity of the divorce
as to third parties is altogether consistent with the basic public records
doctrine. Succession of James 4 could be distinguished because it involved

29. La. Civ. Code art. 2356.
30. See Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89 So. 2d 41 (1956); Peters v. Norris, 191
La. 436, 185 So. 461 (1938); Land v. Acadian Prod. Corp. of La., 57 F. Supp. 338
(W.D. La. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1946); Roux v. Jersey
Ins. Co., 98 So. 2d 906 (La. App. Orl. 1957); Smith v. Marino, 28 So. 2d 780 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), reh'g denied, 29 So. 2d 390 (La. 1947); Washington v. Palmer, 28 So.
2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 213 La. 79, 34 So. 2d 382 (La.
1948). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2406 (1870) ("The effects which compose the ...
community of gains are divided into two equal portions . . . at the dissolution of the
marriage .... ").
31. 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949). Isaiah and Gertrude Payne were married in
Mississippi. While still married, Isaiah moved to Louisiana and purchased a piece of
immovable property. Unable to pay for the property, Isaiah sold it to defendant Royal
in 1941. Meanwhile, in 1938, Isaiah divorced Gertrude, but the judgment was never
recorded. The plaintiff, Humphreys, knew of the above facts and bought Gertrude's
interest believing it to be an undivided half interest. Plaintiff then filed this petitory
action. Id.
32. The only question that is to be determined . , . is whether the wife or her
transferee here can prevail in this case in view of the public policy of this state
that in order to affect third parties all sales of, transactions, or judgments
touching upon or affecting real rights or immovable property must be recorded.
Id. at 221.
33. La. R.S. 9:2756 (Supp. 1987). For text, see supra note 13.
34. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
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a marriage contract which, unlike a divorce judgment or judgment of
separation, need not be recorded to affect third parties. While to some
such a distinction is unsatisfactory,35 the bifurcation has been maintained
by the courts.
Until the supreme court's opinion in Magee v. Amiss, it was safe
to conclude that the only community property interest affected by a

failure to record was an interest established in a recordable judgment.
In Shapiro v. Bryan,3 6 the court of appeal followed this theory and
resolved the conflict in favor of the public records doctrine.3 7 The court
reached its result by employing a balancing test. As between the spouse

who had failed to record and the innocent vendee who had purchased
the property in reliance on the public records, notions of fairness favored
the vendee. The court was fully cognizant of the possibility of some
hardship cases which would arise as a result of this holding. In the
court's opinion, the policy of recordation was stronger than that of
community property.
In the case of Gregory v. Womack,38 under facts virtually identical
to Magee, the court of appeal followed Humphreys and reaffirmed the
strength of the public records doctrine. The court addressed the dep-

rivation of property issue later raised in Magee by saying: "The plaintiff
in this instance procured the divorce and had ample protection of her

rights in the property had she complied with the Louisiana laws relating
to registry." 3 9

In summary, the jurisprudence indicates that, if the public records
doctrine conflicts with community property laws when there is a judgment
35. See, e.g., Redmann, supra note 22, at 504.
36. 132 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). While the wife's suit for separation was
pending, the husband sold certain community immovable property to the defendant. There
was no notice of a lis pendens recorded in the public records. The wife instituted suit

to annul the sale. The defendant insisted that he had possessed no knowledge of the
plaintiff's suit for separation and that he simply relied upon the clear mortgage and
conveyance records. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff's negligence in not
availing herself of the protection afforded by the laws of registry was the only cause of
this litigation.
37. [W]e think it not only reasonable but absolutely necessary to conclude, in

order to preserve the sanctity and security of title to immovables, that the public
registry law should prevail . . . and especially so, in instances where the injured
spouse possessed adequate means of protecting her real property interest from

the actions of her errant husband and failed to do so.
Id. at 103.
38. 300 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974). The
husband and plaintiff wife were married when the property in question was acquired and
became community property. The plaintiff obtained a divorce in a Texas court, and she
failed to record the judgment in the public records of the parish where the community

immovable was situated. The defendant purchased the property at a sheriff's sale.
39. Id. at 215.
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of separation or divorce, the laws of recordation prevail. The courts
have felt that the stability of title to immovable property is more
important than protecting the spouse who did not bother to take steps
to record the judgment of separation or divorce or a lis pendens.
One of the purposes of the marriage exception was to solve the
problem of recording the marriage certificate in all parishes where immovables might eventually be bought. At the time of termination, it is
easier for the spouse to record the judgment or a lis pendens in the
parishes where immovable property is located, because acquisition has
already taken place. Upon termination, the spouse will know or have
the ability to find out where the property is now located. The spouse
must only record in those parishes.
This is the background upon which Magee v. Amiss is built. The
court of appeal decision cites and agrees with Humphreys, Shapiro, and
Gregory; however, the supreme court decided that the conflict between
the two legal systems should be decided in favor of the community
property laws instead of the public records doctrine. For some reason,
the supreme court did not discuss the jurisprudence concerning this
aspect of the public records doctrine. An examination of the court's
decision is necessary to understand the confusion that it may create.

III.

ANALYSIS OF TiH DECISION

Mrs. Magee contended that the actions of Reynolds and the transfer
of property to the subsequent purchasers violated her procedural due
process right of notice. The defendants claimed that they were protected
by the public records doctrine. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal ruled against Mrs. Magee's claim for her one-half interest. With
respect to the recordation issue, the court said that the unrecorded
judgment of separation, "'affecting the immovable property in controversy is utterly null and void as to' the Stockmanns, the Ingleharts,
Reynolds, and River City Federal" and all third parties within the scope
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2755 and 9:2756.4 The court discussed
Humphreys, Shapiro, and Gregory,41 citing them for the proposition
that unrecorded acts will have no legal effect on a third person and
that third persons need only to look to the public records to determine
adverse claims.
The court also addressed Mrs. Magee's due process claim. Since
Mrs. Magee failed to record the judgment of separation or a lis pendens,
there was no refutation of the Civil Code presumption that the residence

40.
41.

Magee v. Amiss, 490 So. 2d 322, 329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
Id. at 328.
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was community property. 42 This codal presumption of community is
important. Before January 1, 1980, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 735 provided that "[t]he husband is the proper defendant in an
action to enforce an obligation against the marital community. '43 When
Reynolds filed its suit, when it obtained its judgment, and when the
judgment became final, the law required only that the husband be named
as a party defendant.
Mrs. Magee argued that the sheriff's sale of the whole property on
April 2, 1980, deprived her of her property without due process of law.
Although she had not filed the judgment of separation until April 30,
1980, she contended that this lack of filing was insufficient to repair
what would otherwise be an unconstitutional deprivation of property
which occurred when she was not properly notified of the pending seizure
and sale of the property. The court discounted Mrs. Magee's assertion
of denial of due process, however, by distinguishing the cases she relied
upon. Mrs. Magee cited Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams 4 and
5
Kirchberg v. Feenstra&in
support of her claim of unconstitutional
deprivation. Distinguishing Mennonite on its facts,4 the court then noted
the language in Kirchberg that the unconstitutionality of Louisiana's

42. The codal articles in effect when Dr. Magee contracted with Reynolds for
the new roof, when Reynolds filed its labor and materialmen's lien, when suit
was filed to enforce the lien, and when judgment was rendered in Reynolds'
favor, and when that judgment became final, established the presumption that
the Magee residence was community property. Mrs. Magee, having failed to
record the judgment of separation in the mortgage records and having failed
to file a notice of lis pendens, did nothing to refute the existence of the
presumption of community. La. Civ. Code art. 2399 et seq.
Id. at 327.
43. Id.
44. 426 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983). The Mennonite Board of Missions was
the mortgagee of property in Indiana that was sold because of the mortgagor's failure
to pay taxes. The mortgagee had been notified neither that the taxes had not been paid
nor that the property had been sold. The United States Supreme Court said, "Notice by
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests
of any party .. . if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." 462 U.S. at 800,
103 S. Ct. at 2712. In Magee, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied Mennonite retroactively. For a discussion, see Rubin and Carter, Notice of Seizure in Mortgage Foreclosures
and Tax Sale Proceedings: The Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 La. L. Rev. 535, 591-92
(1988).
45. 609 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981). On
December 12, 1979, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared La. Civ.
Code art. 2404 (husband is head and master) unconstitutional. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed on March 23, 1981.
46. Magee, 490 So. 2d at 324.
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head and master rule47 was prospective only. 48
The decision as to Reynolds is correct for three interrelated reasons.
First, as a matter of public policy, innocent third parties. should be able
to rely on the public records doctrine. The unrecorded judgment of
separation affected marital real estate which thereafter became subject
to a mechanic's lien and, once the materialman obtained judgment
against the husband, precipitated a sheriff's sale. Despite absence of
citation and service to the wife, the court of appeal decided that the
judgment was null and void as to the subsequent vendees and mortgagees
who relied on the public records. The court correctly relied on the same
reasoning applied in Humphreys, Shapiro, and Gregory. Public policy
dictates that in order for a judgment to affect the rights of third persons,
such as Reynolds, the judgment must be recorded in the public records.
Second, as to Reynolds and the Stockmanns, Mr. and Mrs. Magee
were considered as still married, and their property was subject to
Louisiana's community property regime as it existed at the time of the
seizure in 1980. According to the Civil Code articles then in effect, Mr.
Magee was the "head and master" of the community, and he could
alienate the property without his wife's consent.4 9 The Code of Civil
Procedure also designated the husband as the proper defendant in an
action to enforce a community obligation.50 When the community property was seized and sold, Mrs. Magee thus was afforded due process
according to the law at the time the judgment was obtained and executed.
Not only was notice solely to Mr. Magee proper under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, but, since the public records indicated they
were' still married, the notice of seizure and sale to him could have
reasonably been expected to lead to actual notice to Mrs. Magee. Such
a procedure should satisfy the "reasonable means ' 5' requirement of
Mennonite. Without requiring the title examiner to check every family

47. See La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870).
48. "Since 'our decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroakctively, we avoid that 'injustice or hardship' through a holding of nonretroactivity."
Kirchberg, 609 F.2d at 736.
The court of appeal also distinguished Kirchberg on its facts. "Because the mortgage
in Kirchberg v. Feenstrawas a conventional mortgage, we find the facts of that litigation
distinguishable from the present case and the holding of unconstitutionality to have no
value in disposing of the issues raised in this appeal." 490 So. 2d at 327.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870), repealed, 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1, eff. Jan.
1, 1980. The current law is La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
50. La. Code Civ. P. art. 735. The article was amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 711,
§ 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1980, to allow either spouse to be the proper party defendant.
51. This refers to the reasonable means that must be used in trying to ascertain any
property owner's name and address. In the present case, what was reasonably ascertainable
from the face of the public records was that Mrs. Magee was married to and living with
Mr. Magee.
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court record in every parish and county in the nation to determine if
a separation judgment had been rendered, there seems to be little else
Reynolds could have done to protect itself. No title examiner could
know from the face of the public records that the parties were separated
or divorced. Should the law require the deposition of the debtor as to
his marital status? Could the title examiner rely on the testimony of
the debtor in a proceeding concerning a seizure? If the termination of
the community becomes an exception to the public records doctrine, the
answers to these questions may create instability in property law, an
area of the law that requires stability. The complications suggested by
these questions show the necessity of the prevelance of the public records
doctrine.
Third, recordation served as a process whereby Mrs. Magee could
have received notice of the seizure and sale; however, she failed to
timely invoke the process with regard to Reynolds. She could have
recorded a lis pendens or the judgment of separation prior to the seizure
and sale. It was not the failure of the seizing creditor that caused her
loss, but her own inaction in failing to protect herself. It should be
noted that Mrs. Magee did not record her judgment of separation until
after the house had been sold at the judicial sale. No reason was ever
given for this delay.
The supreme court agreed with the decision of the first circuit in
dismissing Reynolds from liability. "Since the judgment of separation
had not been recorded, Reynolds acted legally in filing suit only against
Archibald Magee. '52 The court of appeal had affirmed the summary
judgments in favor of River City Federal and the Stockmanns.53 However, the supreme court disagreed by reversing those two summary
judgments and remanded for trial the demands against River City Fed54
eral, the Ingleharts, and the Stockmanns,
The supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision as to the
subsequent buyers because they had bought the property after January
1, 1980. On this date the husband was no longer the head and master
of community property. The Civil Code had been amended to require
the concurrence of both spouses for the alienation, encumbrance or lease
of most community property.55 The certificate of mortgage and the
recorded deed revealed Mrs. Magee's interest in the seized property. As
to third parties, the community remained intact. Since Louisiana Civil
Code article 2347 specifically prohibited alienation of her interest without

52.
53.
54.
55.

Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568, 572 (La. 1987).
See supra note 2 (concerning the status of the Ingleharts).
502 So. 2d at 573.
La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
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her concurrence, and since the judicial sale took place after Louisiana
Civil Code article 2347 was effective, at a minimum she was entitled
to notice; the failure to notify voided the sale as to her interest. 6 The
court, ignoring the fact that the court of appeal distinguished Mennonite
on its facts, quoted language from Mennonite to say that '[n]otice by
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice [was] a minimum
constitutional precondition to a proceeding which [would] adversely affect
the ... property interest of any party . . . . 117 In other words, the
subsequent purchasers knew that there was a Mrs. Magee who owned
a one-half interest in the property and that they could only acquire Mr.
Magee's one-half interest.
IV.

UNANSWERED QuEsTIoNs AND IMPLICATIONS

The court of appeal's decision analyzed and discussed the public
records doctrine and the due process issue in a well-reasoned opinion.
The supreme court's reasoning is not as easy to understand. From the
foregoing trace of the conflict between the policies underlying the public
records doctrine and matrimonial regime law, it is clear that, since
Humphreys, the courts have considered the policies of the laws of
recordation to be the more important. Magee v. Amiss indicates, however, that the court has decided this is no longer true; now the community
property laws will prevail. In doing so, the court has significantly weakened the public records doctrine.
A.

Unanswered Questions

Louisiana Civil Code article 2404 was repealed and replaced by
Louisiana Civil Code article 2347. Official comment (a) to Louisiana
Civil Code article 2347 was recited in both the court of appeal and
supreme court decisions. 8 Reynolds and River City Federal argued that,
in light of this specific reference to materialman's liens by the redactors,
the husband clearly possessed the power, both before and after January
1, 1980, to encumber the entirety of the interest in the common real
estate. The court of appeal used the comment as "additional authority
for [the] contention that the sale of the whole of the Magee property

56. 502 So. 2d at 571.
57. Id., quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800, 103 S. Ct. at 2706.
58. Encumbrances imposed by law are not subject to the requirement of the
concurrence of the spouses. Thus, a transaction by one of the spouses acting
alone may give rise to a vendor's privilege, or a mechanics' or materialman's
lien on community property. Likewise, the recordation of a judgment against
a spouse gives rise to a judicial mortgage on community property situated in
the parish in which recordation takes place.
La. Civ. Code art. 2347, comment (a).
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at sheriff's sale protects the sheriff's vendee and subsequent vendees
and mortgagees relying on the public records." 9 For some unstated
reason, the supreme court recited the comment yet did not address it.
The opinion merely said, "Although a lien would appear to be an
encumbrance, the Comments under Article 2347 note . . . . '6 Then the
comment appears. Comment (a) seems contrary to the result the supreme
court achieved, yet the court did not provide a discernable reason for
citing the comment.
Another unanswered concern is the court's failure to address a coowner's ability to repair the property. As River City Federal said in
paragraph four in its application for rehearing: "This Honorable Court
has additionally failed to discuss the very significant question regarding
the husband's ability to contract for necessary repairs to community
property and whether such acts on his part are attributable to, and
inure to the benefit of, the spouse in community.''61 River City Federal
argued that Mr. Magee contracted with Reynolds to perform necessary
repairs on the property. According to former Louisiana Civil Code article
2314,62 a possessor has the right to make necessary repairs to property,
and the co-owners are bound to reimburse his expenses in the cost of
repair. It was submitted that a new roof was clearly a necessary repair,
as a bad or leaking roof would contribute to the destruction of the
whole property. River City Federal believed that, since Mr. Magee had
the right to repair the roof, Mrs. Magee became liable for her share
of the debt thus created. The court never addressed this issue of the
case. A possible explanation is that the court believed Mr. Magee was
attempting to liquidate his and his former wife's interest in the property
6
without her sharing in the proceeds.
As discussed earlier, in applying the jurisprudential rule of Humphreys and the other cases, the dismissal of Reynolds is correct under
the public records doctrine. As to the subsequent purchasers and mort-

59. 490 So. 2d at 329.
60. 502 So. 2d at 570.
61. Application for Rehearing to the Louisiana Supreme Court by River City Federal,
at para. 4.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 2314 (1870) was repealed in 1979 and replaced with La. Civ.
Code arts. 527 and 528.
La. Civ. Code art. 527 reads: "The evicted possessor, whether in good or in bad faith,
is entitled to recover from the owner compensation for necessary expenses incurred for
the preservation of the thing and for the discharge of private or public burdens. He is
not entitled to recover expenses for ordinary maintenance or repairs."
La. Civ. Code art. 528 reads: "An evicted possessor in good faith is entitled to recover
from the owner his useful expenses to the extent that they have enhanced the value of
the thing."
63. 502 So. 2d at 572.
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gagees, the supreme court has placed the viability of the public records
doctrine in doubt. In its motion for rehearing, River City Federal said:
"This Honorable Court, by failure to mention the case of Humphreys
v. Royal ...which holding is inconsistent with the holding of the case
at bar, has created a chasm in the law as it relates to the interpretation
of the Public Records Doctrine." 64 Since Humphreys, the court has
insisted that the public records doctrine should prevail over the community property regime. When the court specified the constitutional
requirement of notice in Magee, however, the community property system
became more important. Unfortunately, in making such a drastic change,
the court did not even mention that it was making a change. The court
accomplished the result it desired without giving the practitioner the
rationale. The supreme court effectively undermined Humphreys, Shapiro, and Gregory without ever mentioning them in the opinion. Essentially, the court followed its holding in Succession of James,6 which
made marriage an exception to the public records doctrine, and made
termination of the community an exception to the public records doctrine.
B.

Implications

The implications of Magee are both narrow and broad in scope.
The narrow implications eminate directly from the facts of the case,
while the broad implications go one step further and apply the court's
rationale to the entire system of public recordation.
One such implication deals with the idea of actual notice. As noted
earlier,66 a third party's actual knowledge of an unrecorded sale is
irrelevant. The only material fact was what was absent from the public
records. With the revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 2347 requiring
concurrence of both of the spouses, the court essentially imputed knowledge to the purchasers that the Magees were married and that both
must concur in the encumbrance. The court used Louisiana Civil Code
article 2347 to impute knowledge to the purchasers that there is an
interest in both spouses. Consequently, if the seller is married at the
time the seller acquires the property, the purchaser is imputed with the
knowledge that the seller only owns a one-half interest and that the
other one-half interest cannot be sold because it would be a violation
of the other spouse's right to due process.
The court has used Louisiana Civil Code article 2347 as a method
of punching a large hole in the public records doctrine. Under the facts

64.
at para.
65.
66.

Application for Rehearing to the Louisiana Supreme Court by River City Federal,
5.
147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
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of Magee it is not so apparent, because Mrs. Magee's name was on
the mortgage certificate. Consider this example of a potential application
of Magee. Vince and Sue marry in 1985. In 1986, Vince purchases a
home in his name alone. In 1987, a court judicially separates Vince and
Sue from bed and board, yet nothing is recorded concerning this judgment. In 1988, Vince sells the house to Amy, who checks the public
records and discovers that the marriage records indicate that Vince and
Sue are still married but that the house is in Vince's name only. Under
operation of Louisiana Civil code article 2347, however, and despite the
public records listing of Vince as the only owner, Amy is imputed with
the knowledge that Sue is a co-owner in indivision. The only thing Amy
can buy from Vince is a one-half interest. Anything larger would be
an unconstitutional deprivation of Sue's due process rights. What is
absent from the public records may no longer be the only knowledge
that affects the parties. This is the narrow implication of the decision.
This case has even broader implications. Before Magee, if A sold
to B and B did not record the sale, A could later sell to C. If C
recorded before- B did, then C would acquire good title even if C was
aware of A's prior sale to B. 67 Magee stands for the proposition that,
if the buyer has knowledge of another party's unrecorded interest (in
Magee this knowledge resulted by retroactive operation of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2347), that interest cannot be alienated without a
violation of that party's due process rights. As exemplified above, C
does not acquire B's interest in the property if C knows that A sold
to B and B did not record the sale. Consequently, the rationale of
Magee may be used to abolish the very foundation of the public records
doctrine. Essentially, the two cases of the public records doctrine, Harang
v. Plattsmie, 8 and McDuffie v. Walker,69 have been undermined. There
may no longer be a "race to the courthouse" if the second purchaser
knows of the first unrecorded sale.
Magee creates two major problems for title examiners, abstractors,
and title insurance companies. The first problem flows directly from
the facts of the case. For alienations, encumbrances and leases before
1980 to be in compliance with the holding of Magee, title examiners
must have checked every family court record in the country in order
to determine the marital status at the time of the sale. In other words,
under Magee the unconstitutionality of Louisiana Civil Code article 2404
now has been applied retroactively. 70 If a separated or divorced husband

67. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
68. 21 La. Ann. 426 (1869). See also supra note 19.
69. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909). See also supra note 19.
70. This first problem might not arise very often due to the 1980 revision. It may
come up at least occasionally, however, because, where applied to sales prior to 1980,
the unconstitutionality of Louisiana Civil Code article 2404 becomes retroactive.
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liquidated any community property without his wife's consent, he deprived her of her property in violation of her due process rights. Any
purchaser who bought under such conditions acquired only a half interest
in the property. Even though these purchasers are presumed to be in
good faith, 71 they do not become complete owners of the property until
at least ten years have elapsed from the time of the sale. 72 Consequently,
any wife who was deprived of her due process rights, because the
purchaser relied on absence of the wife's name from the public records,
still may have a cause of action if the acquisitive prescription period
has not accrued.
.Since a divorce or separation eventually can be decreed in any court
with jurisdiction, the only way a title examiner could have insured that
the purchaser had bought the entire interest was to examine all the
family records in the country to determine that the husband was not
alienating his wife's share. With regard to marital status, title examiners
cannot rely solely on the information provided by the seller, because
the seller may wish to hide his true marital status. Until Magee, the
title examiners had no reason to search the entire country. They simply
relied on the public records and the absence of a lis pendens or a
judgment of separation and divorce.
The second problem is more likely to occur. A broad implication
of Magee is that, if a purchaser has actual knowledge of an interest
not on the public records, this will prevent the purchaser from acquiring
complete ownership. When the court in 186971 laid down the rule that
actual knowledge was irrelevant, the only issue at trial was what was
absent from the public records. The court did not have to admit testimony concerning the various parties' knowledge. Now, however, the
purchaser's knowledge is relevant. The purchaser may be questioned and
cross-examined under oath as to his knowledge of the existence of a
co-owner's interest. Before a title insurance company will issue a policy,
it must also be satisfied that the purchaser had no knowledge of a coowner's interest. Such cases are no longer a simple question of what
was absent from the public records; now a trier of fact must be involved

71. La. Civ. Code arts. 3481 and 3482.
72. La. Civ. Code arts. 3473 and 3475. See also comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art.
3484 which reads:
When a co-owner of an immovable transfers the ownership of the entire
immovable to a third person, the transferee acquires the undivided interest of
the transferor, and in addition he acquires a just title to the remaining parts.
Thus, the transferee acquires the ownership of the entire immovable in ten years
if he is in good faith and if his possession is sufficiently adverse to the interest
of the remaining co-owners.
73. See supra note 19.
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to ascertain the knowledge of the purchaser in order to determine if
there were any unconstitutional deprivations of property.
It is easy to see the court's concern for the rights of Mrs. Magee
and others similarly situated. However, the court did not have to cloud
the public records doctrine in order to protect the future Mrs. Magees
of Louisiana. Granted, a person should not be deprived of his interest
in property without some form of notice; yet, the public records must
remain stable. Both purposes may be achieved without abandoning the
public records doctrine.
There is a process by which the co-owner may protect himself and
at the same time retain the integrity of recordation. When there are
two innocent parties, the party who could have most easily prevented
the problem by minimal acts should bear the loss. Between Mrs. Magee
and the subsequent purchasers, Mrs. Magee could have more easily
prevented this litigation by filing the judgment of separation or a lis
pendens. For any future spouse or co-owner, all that is required is that
all spouses and co-owners are listed in the public records. If this simple
procedure is followed, purchasers may rely on the absence of instruments
in the records; co-owners are then assured that their interests are known
and protected. If this procedure is not performed, the co-owner still
retains an action against the co-owner who alienated the property without
permission. The supreme court could have held that Mr. Magee was
liable to Mrs. Magee, and the public records thereby could have been
protected. An alternative holding could have been that, since Mrs. Magee
did not record any of these documents, she was negligent in the handling
of her property, and innocent third party purchasers should be protected. 74 The dangerous implications in Magee v. Amiss could have been
avoided.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since at least 1920, the courts have recognized that there has been
a conflict between the public records doctrine and community property
law. Whenever a recordable judgment was involved, the courts have

74. This is the holding of Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So. 2d at 97, discussed supra note
36 and accompanying text. See also Gregory v. Womack, 300 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974), discussed supra note 38 and accompanying
text; the court of appeal decision in Magee; and also the very recent case of Camel v.
Waller, 515 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
In Camel the facts were essentially the same as Humphrey v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41
So. 2d 220 (1949). Despite the supreme court's implicit questioning of Humphrey in
Magee, the court of appeal held that Humphrey was authority under the facts given in
Camel. Camel distinguished Magee by stating that, in Magee, the wife's community interest
was apparent of the face of the public records.
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consistently ruled that the public records doctrine should prevail. Not
only does Magee v. Amiss change this, but it also fails to clearly discuss
why there was a change or what may be the implications of that change.
By making the termination of the community an exception to the public
records doctrine, the decision may eliminate or severely damage the
public records doctrine. This would create instability in an area of the
law that requires consistency.
As a result of the unusual fact that the case straddled the matrimonial
regime law revision, it would not be difficult for a court to distinguish
Magee. Subsequent courts could decide that since the facts of Magee
spanned the two relevant periods, Kirchberg should be applied retroactively only to this case.
Both the innocent purchasers and unrecorded owners can be protected. All that is required is that the unrecorded owner either file a
lis pendens, a judgment of separation or divorce, or make sure his name
is recorded on the original sale. If such a decision is made by future
courts, the disruption 7 caused by Magee may be forgotten.
Michael David Ferachi

75. For a differing viewpoint, that the public records doctrine is not implicated in
Magee and that the spouse's interest impinged upon is too great to be disregarded, see
Hargrave, Developments in the Law-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 47 La. L. Rev. 333
(1986).

